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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the educational enterprise is LEARNING.   Engagement is essential to 
achieving this purpose.   How do we increase the proportion of our young people who enroll in 
and attend school while simultaneously setting high standards and inducing them to become 
engaged and effective learners?   This paper proposes an agenda of reform to achieve these 
two goals.  Each of proposal has a research literature behind it that makes a good case that the 
policy simultaneously raises the achievement of existing students and encourages them to stay 
in school or alternatively achieves one of these goals without sacrificing the other.    
Strategy # 1 says “Do a better job of convincing adolescents that learning and schooling 
pays off big time.”   Strategy # 2  proposes a variety of ways of making secondary schools both 
more attractive and more effective.  Expand the offerings of and access to career-technical 
education.  Stop building large high schools. Create a new set of small high quality schools of 
choice: KIPP Academies and Career Academies. 
In Strategy # 3 I propose that end-of-course exams [not minimum competency exams or 
standards based exams] be the primary mechanism (along with teacher grades) for signaling 
student achievements to colleges and employers and for holding high schools accountable.  
High quality end-of-course exams that reliably measure achievement over the entire A to F 
range would need to be developed.  Exam grades would appear on the student’s transcript, be 
part of the final grade in the course and be factored into college admissions and placement 
decisions.  The exam would be a spur for everyone in the class to try harder, not just those who 
are struggling to pass the course.   This strategy brings the interests of students, parents and 
teachers into alignment, encourages a pro-learning culture in the classroom and makes it easier 
for teachers to be rigorous and demanding.   Universal curriculum-based external exam 
systems—as they are called--work remarkably well in Europe, Canada, North Carolina and New 
York and there is every reason to expect them to be equally successful when implemented in 
other SREB states.     
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Enrollment, Attendance and Engagement → Achievement:   
Successful Strategies for Motivating Students - Evidence of 
Effectiveness from Comparisons of 50 States and 45 Nations   
 
The purpose of the educational enterprise is LEARNING.   Engagement is essential to 
achieving this purpose.  Students must come to school, pay attention, do homework, engage with 
the subject and construct their new knowledge in ways that allow them to retrieve it later.  How are 
students induced to do all this hard work?  Teachers try to make their subject interesting, but sixty–
one percent of American students, nevertheless, say they “often feel bored.”  Additional 
motivators---diplomas, grades, exit exams, college admissions, etc.—are therefore essential.   
We assess each student’s learning, we honor it in ceremonies and signal (describe) it to 
parents, employers and colleges expecting them to reward the learning in their own way.  The 
prospect of these rewards strengthens incentives for students to enroll in and attend school, 
participate in class and become engaged in learning.   
I was asked to address the following question: How do we increase the proportion of 
our young people who enroll in and attend school while simultaneously setting high 
standards and inducing them to become engaged and effective learners?   Many argue 
there is an inherent conflict between these goals.  I examined the research literature on exit 
exams to see whether these claims are supported by the weight of the evidence.  I concluded 
that policies that push teachers to set higher standards by establishing tougher and tougher 
high school graduation requirements often do have the side effect of reducing enrollment and 
graduation rates and focusing instruction on test preparation.   There are, however, other ways 
of skinning the cat [inducing students to put more time, effort and engagement into learning] and 
I present a number of them below grouped together under three general strategies.  Each of 
these proposals has a research literature behind it that makes a good case (some of which I 
present in the text or the appendix) that the policy simultaneously raises the achievement of 
existing students and encourages them to stay in school or alternatively achieves one of these 
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goals without sacrificing the other.   Thus by implementing a mix of these policy initiatives we 
are able to improve participation and achievement at the same time.  I have left out of my 
discussion policy proposals that have been shown to have no effect or where evidence of 
efficacy is absent. 
Strategies 
1. Convince Students that the Benefits of Staying in School are Huge  
>> Advertise on Television 
>> Recruit mentors at local colleges and use college aspirations as a motivator 
2. Make High School more Attractive to At Risk Students 
 
>> Offer a Variety of Quality Career-Technical Programs at Convenient Locations  
>> Never Expand an already large high school.  New high schools should be small. 
>> Create more middle school magnets like the KIPP Academies 
>> Create a Career Academy at each of your state’s Vocational Technical Centers 
  
3. Exit Exams should Create Moderate Stakes for Everyone, not High Stakes for Just a 
Few 
 
 >> Base Accountability for High School Students on End-of-Course Exams  
 >> Create Additional Graduated Rewards for Doing Well on State Tests.  
 >> Reform the Admissions Policies of State University Systems   
 
Strategy # 1 says “Do a better job of convincing adolescents that learning and schooling 
pays off big time.”   Strategy # 2  proposes a variety of ways of making secondary schools both 
more attractive and more effective.  Expand the offerings of and access to career-technical 
education.  Stop building large high schools. Create a new set of small high quality schools of 
choice: KIPP Academies and Career Academies.  Note there was a reason why I did not 
propose a general liberalization of charter school regulations. We do not know the impact of 
charters on student achievement.  Nor do we know which charter school model works best of 
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all.  It will probably take a decade to find out, so I limit my recommendations to the two 
models—KIPP Academies and Career Academies—for which there is good evidence. 
 In Strategy # 3 I propose that end-of-course exams [not minimum competency exams or 
standards based exams] be the primary mechanism (along with teacher grades) for signaling 
student achievements to colleges and employers and for holding high schools accountable.  
High quality end-of-course exams that reliably measure achievement over the entire A to F 
range would need to be developed.  Exam grades would appear on the student’s transcript, be 
part of the final grade in the course and be factored into college admissions and placement 
decisions.  The exam would be a spur for everyone in the class to try harder, not just those who 
are struggling to pass the course.   This strategy brings the interests of students, parents and 
teachers into alignment, encourages a pro-learning culture in the classroom and makes it easier 
for teachers to be rigorous and demanding.   Universal curriculum-based external exam 
systems—as they are called--work remarkably well in Europe, Canada, North Carolina and New 
York and there is every reason to expect them to be equally successful when implemented in 
other SREB states.     
Strategy # 1----Convince Students the Benefits of Staying in School are Huge  
1.1  Advertise the Facts-- Schools need to make sure that students are aware of the 
disastrous consequences of not graduating from high school.  Completing high school increases 
earnings by 30 to 40 percent.  A GED will raise earnings, but by a lot less.  The benefits of 
finishing high school are particularly large for those who take three or more advanced CTE 
courses during the final two years of high school.  Shortly after they graduate from high school, 
they earn 50 percent more than drop outs.  Another benefit of finishing high school is the 
opportunity to go to college.  Each year of college adds an additional 15 to 20 percent to annual 
earnings.  The payoff to college is just as high for CTE concentrators as for academic 
concentrators.  High school CTE courses do not lose value when the student completes an 
Associates or Bachelors degree.  They continue to add to earning power.   
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I would get this across by creating a series of one or two-minute public service television 
ads targeted at teens and pre-teens in which successful individuals who rose from 
disadvantaged backgrounds tell their own true story directly into the camera.  The theme of 
these vignettes would be “There were no short cuts.  I worked hard in school and it paid off.”   
Some of the time career-technical programs would be featured.   Contests should be sponsored 
to solicit ads from students in television production classes and independent television 
production companies.  Focus groups of teenagers should be the judges in some of these 
contests. 
1.2  Use college aspirations as motivators. Almost all secondary school students 
aspire to go to college—even those with poor basic skills.  Unfortunately, many of them fail to 
realize that the academic foundation they begin to develop in middle school is critical to later 
success in college.  Even though 75 percent of the students in the bottom quartile on achievement 
tests say they want to go to college, only 3 percent of graduates from the bottom quartile have 
obtained a Bachelors degree ten years later and only 4 percent have gotten Associates degrees.  
Students in the top quartile were twenty times more likely to get a bachelors degree (National 
Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education of Statistics, 1998 p. 329).    
Once students are made aware of just how important it is to develop a high level of 
skills, they will be motivated to take more demanding courses and to study hard.  Schools 
should build on this motivation by taking students on trips to local colleges, informing parents 
about financial aid options, and inviting former students to talk about college life and the 
importance of studying in middle and high school.  Teachers can help by persuading student 
leaders to set demanding personal goals for college, make studying a norm, and encourage 
other students to raise their academic aspirations and commitment.   
The Foundation for Excellent Schools has been helping schools partner with local 
colleges to enhance college aspirations through a program called The Century Program (TCP).   
Each TCP partnership targets at least 100 underserved students—youth who might not 
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graduate from high school but, through TCP intervention, will graduate and attend and succeed 
in college. Designated “TCP Scholars,” these students benefit from four core practices that have 
proved effective in raising aspirations and student performance in FES schools nationwide: 
mentoring, goal setting, early college awareness, and community service. TCP will help these 
students improve academic performance and attendance, develop personal and academic 
goals, and ultimately ensure that they graduate from high school and go on to and graduate 
from college.  All TCP Scholars participate in high-impact activities that incorporate four core 
practices:  
1. Mentoring: All TCP Scholars have a mentor, either a college student, older high school 
student, and/or community member.  
2. Early College Awareness: Colleges offer activities for TCP Scholars and their parents/ 
caregivers to help them understand how to access and succeed in college.  
3. Goal Setting: College students help TCP Scholars to identify short- and long-term, as 
well as “dream,” goals.  
4. Community Service: All TCP Scholars participate in service activities that enable them 
to give back to their schools and communities.  
For more information go to   http://www.fesnet.org/tcpmain.cfm 
Strategy # 2----Make High School more Attractive to At Risk Students 
 2.1  Offer a Variety of Career-Technical Education Programs at Convenient 
Locations--Allowing students to start preparation for their chosen career in upper secondary 
school increases the share of young people who choose to stay in school when they are no longer 
required to attend.  People have diverse interests, diverse talents and diverse learning styles.  The 
labor market is similarly diverse in the skills and talents that are sought.  A "one size fits all" upper 
secondary education is bound to fail many students.  Students should not be forced to take CTE 
courses, but neither should they be forced to take only academic courses.  The Report of the 
Advisory Committee for the National Assessment of Vocational Education states the case well: 
Career and technical education empowers students by providing a range of 
learning opportunities that serve different learning styles.  CTE relies on a powerful 
mode of teaching and learning that cognitive scientists call “contextual” or 
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“situated” learning, both in classrooms and in workplaces. For many students, 
applying academic and technical skills to real-world activities, using computers and 
other tools, and being able to see how their learning is related to the world of work 
make CTE classes more interesting and motivating, and more educationally 
powerful than standard academic classes. A career focus often gives students a 
sense of direction and motivates them to achieve and to stay in school....This is 
especially important for young people who learn best by doing, a group that 
includes disproportionate numbers of disadvantaged and special education 
students. Just having the option of being able to concentrate in CTE in high school 
results in more young people staying in school because more individually relevant 
choices are available to them. (Advisory Committee for the National Assessment of 
Vocational Education 2003. p. 2.)  
 
Evidence of Efficacy:  High school CTE teaches technical skills that are highly valued 
by employers.  A program of four high school CTE courses increases earnings by $1347.00 
immediately after graduation and by $1993.00 eight years later.   The instructional cost of such 
a program is less than $5000, so real rates of return exceed 30% per year (Bishop and Mane 
2004).  This is one of the reasons why high school students interviewed in 1997 who said they 
were doing a “career major” were less likely to drop out and more likely to graduate in the next 
three to four years (Mertens et al. 1982). 1   
The best way of assessing the effect of the CTE option on high school completion rates 
is to study what happened when the option was first introduced.   In country after country, 
introducing CTE options at the secondary level helped spur expansions of secondary school 
attendance.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, Latin was a required subject, vocational 
classes were unknown and only 6 percent of the age cohort got a diploma.  By 1927/8 
vocational courses were three times more popular than Latin and 27 percent of the age cohort 
was graduating from high school.  Many historians explain the growth of vocational education as 
a response to public pressure to open upper-secondary education to children from immigrant 
and working class families.   They argue that very few immigrant and working class children 
would have made it into and through high school if a vocational option had not been available.  
A recent study by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz has found that career-technical 
education generated far larger payoffs than academic education at the beginning of the 
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twentieth century.    Adult males in Iowa who had spent a year or so at proprietary business 
schools teaching typing, shorthand, bookkeeping, real estate and other commercial subjects 
earned 34 percent more in 1915 than people who had gotten a purely academic education of 
the same length.  Unmarried females who had attended these schools earned 47 percent extra 
(Goldin and Katz, 2000, p. 37-39, 43).   Public schools added typing, stenography and 
bookkeeping to their curriculum because their students wanted to be able to get these new high 
paying jobs and local employers wanted access to a supply of well trained workers.    If public 
high schools had remained purely academic, their graduates would have soon had difficulty 
getting good jobs and secondary enrollment would have grown more slowly.    
Further evidence of the positive effects of the CTE option on school attendance comes 
from comparing nations.   Figures 1 and 2 present Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) data on graduation rates and school attendance rates in Europe, 
Australia and North America and how they correlate with the vocational share of upper-
secondary enrollments.  The four countries--the US, Canada, Spain and Portugal--that 
emphasize CTE the least have significantly lower proportions of 15 to 19 year olds in school and 
lower graduation rates from upper secondary school.   
Note also that the countries that emphasize CTE do not have lower reading and 
mathematics achievement on the age 15 PISA assessments in 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 3 
and 4).  Multi-variate analysis of these data confirm these conclusions.   
Enrollment, Attendance and Engagement →  CAHRS WP04-17            
 
Page 11 
Figure 3--Relationship of Availability of Career-Tech in 
Secondary School to Reading Literacy of 15 yr olds in 
PISA
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Figure 1--Availability of Career-Tech in Secondary School and 
Upper-Secondary Graduation Rates
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Figure 4--Relationship of Availability of Career-Tech in 
Secondary School to Mathematics Achievement of 15 yr 
olds in PISA
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Figure 2--Availability of Career-Tech in Secondary School 
and Enrollment of 15-19 yr olds in Schools & Colleges
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2.2   Never Expand an already large high school; New high schools should be small  
There is overwhelming evidence that small high schools graduate a larger share of their 
students than large high schools.   The state level analysis presented in the appendix concludes 
that doubling the mean size of the public high schools in a state from 500 to 1000 lowers the 
enrollment rates of seventeen year old by 2 percentage points, lowers public high school 
graduation rates by about 6 percentage points and lowers overall graduation rates by 4.6 
percentage points.  Studies that use high schools rather than states as observations also 
conclude that size is the school policy that has the biggest effect on graduation rates.  I am not 
aware of any conclusive evidence showing that breaking up large high schools into smaller units 
through house plans consistently lowers dropout rates.    
2.3.    Create more middle school magnets like the KIPP Academies 
 The KIPP (Knowledge is Power Program) Academies are the nation’s most successful 
middle school model for students from disadvantaged backgrounds.  KIPP academies are non-
selective schools of choice that run from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM during the normal 180 day school 
year, have compulsory Saturday enrichment programs three times a month and a three week 
summer school.  During the summer prior to entering middle school for the first time, new 
students spend a couple of weeks in skills building exercises, learning the KIPP culture and 
bonding with their future classmates and teachers.  KIPP academies are islands of discipline 
and caring and demanding teachers in a sea of chaotic schools led by dispirited adults.  Parents 
queue for a chance to enroll their child in one of these very demanding schools.  Achievement 
gains are remarkably large and have been replicated in new implementations of the model.  At 
present there are only thirty-eight of these schools.   We need to establish many more [contact 
the KIPP foundation about bringing one of these model schools to your area].    They succeed 
because of their dedicated teachers and distinctive culture.  KIPP teachers take over normative 
Enrollment, Attendance and Engagement →  CAHRS WP04-17            
 
Page 14 
leadership of the school and make working hard the norm.  The Dean of Students at the KIPP 
DC: Key Academy described the system this way: 
The cool kids in our school are kids who work hard, because we as adults have 
made sure that to be "in" you have to work hard.  We have an extensive system 
of rewards and consequences that every teacher in every grade administers the 
exact same way. The consistency from classroom to classroom and across 
grade levels is the key, and it has helped us to establish that culture of hard 
work.  We are all working together and have been successful because, to be 
frank, we haven't allowed kids, who in the past may have gotten away with not 
doing any work or who may have put other kids down for being nerdy or too 
studious, the opportunities to become "cool" or "in."  Our discipline is firm; if you 
don't work hard you don't get to sit with your friends at lunch, go on field trips, 
participate in gym class, attend special events, etc., and we, the adults, are all on 
the same page with this.  It's hard to set the norms when you are not the one 
participating. On the flip side, if you do work hard, then you will be rewarded in 
fun ways—pizza parties, skating trips, things like that.  So, to have fun and fit in, 
kids must adapt, they must work hard.  You're probably saying to yourself that 
this doesn't sound like your traditional middle school and why would any kid want 
to put in such hard work.  But the kids love it here, because they are discovering 
that great things happen to people who work hard.  And they want to be 
included… (Dean of Students of KIPP DC: KEY Academy, 2002).   
2.4. Create a Career Academy at each of your state’s Area Vocational Technical 
Centers 
 
 The MDRC evaluation of the impacts of Career Academies used a powerful random 
assignment methodology.  It found that the students who won the lottery and were admitted to 
career academies earned significantly more after high school than the students who did not win 
the lottery and were assigned to attend a regular high school.  The self-contained career 
academies were more successful than the academies that mixed academy students with non-
academy students in some classes (Kemple et al, 1994). 
Therefore, all newly created career academies should be a self contained all day Tech-
Prep magnet schools with a career theme.  Each one should have a distinctive philosophy, its 
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own disciplinary system, its own program of extra curricular activities lasting until 5:30PM and 
field trips to work sites.  Students choosing to join the school would have to sign a contract 
agreeing to abide by and support its distinctive disciplinary and educational philosophy [Visit a 
KIPP Academy and try to adapt some of their strategies to your circumstance].   Students would 
be told that they must live up to their contract to stay at the school.   Because of their strict rules 
and consistent discipline KIPP academies have achieved much lower turnover rates and much 
higher achievement than other schools serving disadvantaged students in their city.   Teachers 
of core academic subjects, foreign languages and some of the CTE teachers would be full time 
in the academy and would be responsible for enforcing the school’s disciplinary code.  A variety 
of electives could be offered by arranging for specialist teachers from a nearby high school or 
experts from the community to teach part time at the career academy.   Some advanced CTE 
courses would be taught by regular AVT teachers who also teach the students who commute to 
the AVT for afternoon classes.   This way the specialized CTE facilities would be used all day, 
not just in the afternoon.  The school should be kept small—probably less than 120 students per 
grade.  Excess demand for places makes the students feel special, builds school spirit and 
makes it easier for teachers to be academically demanding.     
Strategy # 3---- Exit Exams should Create Moderate Stakes for Everyone, not High Stakes 
     for Just a Few 
 
Public schools in the United States are pursuing three contrasting student accountability 
strategies.  
• Minimum competency exams (MCE) or standards-based exams (SBE) that must be 
passed to receive a regular high school diploma.  Six states use minimum competency 
exams (MCEs) focusing on basic skills below the high school level.  Eleven states 
use Standards Based Exams (SBEs) that are aligned with state standards and 
assess high school level skills. 
• Voluntary Curriculum-Based External Exit Exams (VCBEEE) such as Advanced 
Placement, International Baccalaureate, California’s Golden State exams and pre 1996 
New York State Regents exams.  
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• Universal Curriculum-Based External Exit Exam Systems (UCBEEES) such as 
those found in Australia, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France and the Netherlands and 
the systems established in North Carolina and New York in the late 1990s and now 
under development in Virginia, Maryland and some other SREB states.   
 All of these exit exams:    
1. Produce signals of achievement that generate important rewards for students who do 
well on the exit exams:  For MCEs and SBEs the reward is a regular high school diploma.  
For CBEEES the nature and the magnitude of the rewards vary.  In North Carolina, New 
York  and Canada, CBEEE grades are averaged with teacher assessments to generate final 
grades for specific courses.  In Europe and East Asia, CBEEE results influence employer 
hiring decisions and university admissions decisions (serving the function that the SAT-1 
and ACT serve in the U.S.).  CBEEES sometimes make one eligible for a more prestigious 
diploma, a scholarship or confer rights to enroll in higher-level post-secondary institutions. 
While some stakes are essential, moderate stakes appear to be sufficient to generate 
significant improvements in learning.  
2. Define achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students in 
the classroom or the school.  Students are no longer engaged in a zero-sum competition 
with their classmates.  Since everyone in the class can be successful, peer norms will be 
more favorable to learning.   Achievement of students at different schools can be compared, 
so students will stop pressuring teachers to “go easy” and parents will push for the hiring of 
more qualified teachers. 2   
3. Are controlled by the education authority that establishes the curriculum for and 
funds K-12 education.  When a national or provincial ministry of education sponsors an 
external exam, it is more likely to be aligned with the national or provincial curriculum and to 
be used for school accountability; not just for student accountability.  Curriculum reform is 
facilitated because coordinated changes in instruction and exams are feasible.  The school 
system as a whole must be made to accept responsibility for how all students do on the 
exams.  This is one of the primary reasons why SAT-1 and ACT tests are of little value for 
holding K-12 education accountable.  
In other respects, universal and voluntary curriculum-based external exit exam systems 
are different from MCEs and Standards Based Exams.  The CBEEES have the following 
additional characteristics:  
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4. Assess a major portion of what students are expected to know and be able to do.  
Studying to prepare for an exam (whether set by one’s own teacher or by a state department 
of education) should result in the student learning important material and developing valued 
skills.  Some MCEs, SBEs, CBEEES and teacher exams do a better job of achieving this 
goal than others.  External exams cannot assess every instructional objective, so teacher 
grades continue to have an important role.   
5. Are collections of End-of-Course Exams (EOCE).   Since they assess the content of 
specific sequences of courses, alignment between instruction and assessment is maximized 
and teacher accountability is enhanced. This feature also aligns the interests of teachers, 
students and parents.  Teachers become coaches helping their team do battle with the 
national or provincial exam.  Parents and students should be less likely to pressure teachers 
to lower standards.  Grades on EOCEs should be part of the overall course grade further 
integrating the external exam into the classroom culture. 
6. Signal multiple levels of achievement in the subject.  If only a pass-fail signal is 
generated by an exam and passing is necessary to graduate, the standard will almost 
inevitably to be set low enough to allow almost everyone to pass after multiple tries.  The 
bulk of students who can easily pass the test are not induced to work harder (Kang 1985; 
Becker and Rosen 1992; Costrell 1994; Betts and Costrell 2001).  CBEEES signal 
achievement levels, so all students, not just those at the bottom of the class, have an 
incentive to study hard.3   Consequently, CBEEES should have a more pervasive effect 
on classroom culture than MCEs and SBEs.  
7. Assess more difficult material. Since CBEEES signal the full range of achievement in 
the subject, they contain more difficult questions and problems. This induces teachers to 
spend more time on cognitively demanding skills and topics.  MCEs (and SBEs to a 
lesser extent) are designed to identify which students have failed to surpass a minimum 
standard, so they tend not to ask difficult questions.  If regular instruction focuses on 
preparing students for a MCE, the majority of the students who are not at risk of failing 
will be getting a diluted and undemanding curriculum.   
Voluntary Curriculum-Based External Exit Exams (VCBEEEs) are taken by self-selected 
students who have chosen to take more rigorous programs of study.   Exams for a set of elite 
schools, advanced courses (AP Exams & NYS Regents exams prior to 1996) or applicants to 
elite colleges (SAT-2s) will raise standards at the top of the vertical curriculum, but probably 
have little effect on the rest of the students.  Achievement gaps between high and low ability 
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students and high and low SES students will increase.  By contrast, universality implies that all 
students are required to take external exams though not necessarily the same set of exams.  
Many nations (e.g. Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Scotland, France, England) allow students 
to choose which subjects to be examined in and offer high and intermediate level exams in the 
same subject.   
Evidence that Exit Exams Increase Learning:  Universal curriculum-based external exit 
exam systems are found all over the world, so many studies have examined their impacts.   The 
nations and provinces that use UCBEEES (and typically teacher grades as well) to signal 
student achievement have significantly higher achievement levels than otherwise comparable 
jurisdictions that base high stakes decisions on college admissions tests and/or teacher grades.  
Students from countries with UCBEEE systems outperform students from other countries at a 
comparable level of economic development by 1.0 to 1.5 grade level equivalents (GLE) in 
mathematics, science and reading.4   Analysis of PISA data collected in 2000-01 finds that 
Universal CBEEES increases reading, mathematics and science literacy of native-born students by 
1.0 to 1.5 grade level equivalents (see rows 1, 2 and 3 of Appendix Table 3). 
Other studies compare students living in different provinces/states in Germany, Canada 
and the United States.  Wößmann found that the German Lander with centralized UCBEEES had 
significantly higher scores on the PISA literacy assessments.  Students attending school in 
Canadian provinces with UCBEEES were a statistically significant one-half of a U.S grade level 
equivalent ahead in math and science of comparable students living in provinces without CBEEES 
(Bishop 1997, 1999a).   In 1990 New York State’s Regents exam system was the only example of 
a voluntary curriculum-based external exit exam system in the United States.  Graham and 
Husted’s (1993) analysis of 1991 SAT test scores in the 37 states with reasonably large test taking 
populations found that New York State students did much better than students of the same race 
and social background in other states.  By the middle of the 1990s another state, North Carolina, 
had established a UCBEEES.  Controlling for ethnicity, social background and other standard’s 
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based reform policies, 8th graders in New York and North Carolina in 1996-98 were about one-
half of a GLE ahead of comparable students in other states in reading, math and science.  (see 
Figure 5,  Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001).  Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop (2001) 
found that New Yorkers entering high school in 1988 learned about a half a GLE more between 8th 
grade and 12th grade than comparable students in other states (see Figure 6).  MCE/SBEs had 
small (about 10 percent of a grade level equivalent) statistically insignificant effects on learning. 
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Fig. 6—’Effects’ of Graduation Requirements on 
8th to 12th Grade Test Score Gains by GPA in 8th
Grade
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What is the primary mechanism by which CBEEES increase student achievement?  Do 
they induce school districts to hire more qualified teachers, to devote more time to teaching core 
subjects, to assign more homework etc?  The impacts of UCBEEES on school policies and 
instructional practices have been studied in the TIMSS data, in PISA data and in the Canadian 
International Assessment of Educational Progress data.  UCBEEES are not associated with 
higher teacher-pupil ratios nor greater spending on K-12 education.  They are, however, 
associated with higher minimum standards for entry into the teaching profession, higher teacher 
salaries, a greater likelihood of having teachers specialize in teaching one subject in middle 
school and a greater likelihood of hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they will 
teach.  Teacher satisfaction with their job appeared to be lower, possibly because of the 
increased pressure for accountability that results from the existence of good signals of individual 
student achievement.  Schools in UCBEEES jurisdictions devote more hours to math and 
science instruction and build and equip better science labs (Bishop 1997, 1999b). 
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 Fears that UCBEEES have caused the quality of instruction to deteriorate appear to be 
unfounded.  Students in UCBEEES jurisdictions were less likely to say that memorization is the 
way to learn the subject and more likely to do experiments in science class.  Apparently, 
teachers subject to the subtle pressure of an external exam four years in the future adopted 
strategies that are conventionally viewed as "best practice," not strategies designed to maximize 
scores on multiple-choice tests.  Quizzes and tests were more common, but in other respects 
UCBEEES jurisdictions were no different on a variety of indicators of pedagogy.  Students were 
more likely to get tutoring assistance from teachers after school.  They were just as likely to 
enjoy the subject and they were more likely to believe that science is useful in every day life and 
more likely to talk with their parents about schoolwork (Bishop 1999b).  
 Another way to assess the effects of exit exams and standards-based reform is to 
compare achievement gains in states that have recently introduced exit exams to gains in states 
that have not.   Studies making these comparisons have concluded that scores rise more rapidly 
in the states introducing test-based accountability.  Norman Fredrickson (1994) found that 
states introducing “high stakes” testing systems achieved larger gains on NAEP mathematics 
questions between 1978 and 1986.   Martin Carnoy and Susanna Loeb (2003) found that 4th 
and 8th grade math achievement gains from 1996 to 2000 were significantly larger in states with 
strong test-based accountability. Effects were particularly strong for Blacks and Hispanics and 
remained large when adjustments were made for changes in exclusion rates.  Barak 
Rosenshine (2003) excluded states with big increases in exclusion rates and then compared 
four-year NAEP test score gains of the remaining high-stakes states to the gains in states with 
no stakes.  He concluded “that students in the clear high-stakes states were, indeed, learning 
mathematics and reading that was beyond the specific content of the statewide tests (p. 3).”   
Henry Braun (2004) study of gains between 1992 and 2000 concluded: “For each grade, when 
we examine the relative gains of states over the period, we find that the comparisons strongly 
favor the high-stakes testing states.  Moreover, the results cannot be accounted for by 
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differences between the two groups of states with respect to changes in the percent of students 
excluded from NAEP over the same period (p. 2).”    
 Plans for new high school graduation tests are announced many years in advance of 
actual implementation.  These announcements start a change process that affects elementary 
as well as secondary school teachers.  Consequently, it will typically be a “half a generation” 
(CEP, 2004 p. 26) before students exhibit the full effects of a new MCE, SBE or UCBEEES.5  
This implies that statistical power is maximized by measuring change over a period that runs 
from the announcement date to many years after the new graduation requirements are 
imposed.    
 Figure 7 plots the gains from 1992 to 2003 gains on 8th grade NAEP math tests 
(adjusted for the effects of changes in exclusion rates) against Education Week’s overall rating 
of the quality of each state’s standards and school accountability system for 1996, 1997 and 
2002.  School accountability systems were not well developed in 1992, so the positive 
relationship visible in Figure 5 suggests that the introduction of standards-based reform and 
school accountability systems during the 1990s had positive effects.  The graph also suggests 
that the states that introduced new student accountability systems during this period had 
particularly large gains.  The two states—North Carolina and New York, represented by 
squares—that established UCBEEES during the 1990s had much larger gains on the NAEP 
tests than would be predicted by their Education Week accountability rating.  So did the five 
states—Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio and Virginia represented by triangles---that 
introduced standards-based exit exams between 1992 and 2003 and the three SREB states—
Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina represented by circles—that introduced MCE/SBEs 
between 1989 and 2001.  Multivariate regressions found that test score gains were about 60 
percent of a grade level equivalent higher in states introducing a UCBEEES and about 30 
percent of a GLE higher in states introducing MCE/SBE between 1992 and 2003.     
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 In sum, MCE/SBE graduation exams appear to increase student achievement by 10 to 
30 percent of a grade level equivalent.   By contrast, high stakes UCBEEES such as the GCSE 
and A levels in England and the BAC in France increase student achievement by more than a 
grade level equivalent, an effect that is five or six times bigger than the mean for studies of the 
effects of MCE/SBEs.   The effects of low and moderate stakes UCBEEES—eg. North Carolina, 
Canada, the Netherlands, New York prior to 2000-- where grades on external exams are only 
one component of the course grade and passing the test is not necessary to graduate appear to 
lie between the two extremes.   
 
 
Fig. 7--State Standards and Accountability Rating and 1992 
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 Evidence on the Effects of Exit Exams on Dropouts and Completion rates:  What 
effects do high stakes MCE/SBE exams and curriculum-based external exit exam systems have on 
high school enrollment rates and college attendance?     Analyses of U.S. state cross section data 
presented in Appendix Table 1 and 2 conclude the MCE/SBEs had no significant effect on 
aggregate enrollment rates or graduation rates during the 1990s.  The total number Carnegie units 
required to graduate, however, was negatively related to enrollment rates and graduation rates 
(Bishop and Mane 2000; Lillard and DeCicca 2001).   The longitudinal NELS-88 data set allows a 
more refined look at the distributional effects of CBEEES and MCEs on high school completion.   
Students with low or average GPAs in 8th grade were significantly more likely to get their diploma 
late or to get a GED when they were from New York or a state with an MCE (see figure 8 and 9).  
The proportion of 8th graders who eventually got either a regular diploma or a GED was no different 
in New York but significantly lower for low GPA students from other MCE states  (see figure 10, 
Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001).  As in Europe, fast paced instruction and high standards 
for getting an academic diploma results in some students taking longer to get the diploma and 
other students switching over to less demanding programs of study. 
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Figure 9-- Probability of Getting GED
by 8th grade GPA & State Minimum Competency Exam
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Figure 10-- Probability of Not Getting a Diploma or GED
by 8th grade GPA & State Minimum Competency Exam
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 International comparisons are the best way to assess the effects of Universal Curriculum-
Based External Exit Exam Systems on enrollment rates and completion rates.  I analyzed OECD 
data on school enrollment rates of 15 to 19 year olds, upper-secondary graduation rates and years 
spent in school [summed net-enrollment rates of people from age 5 to 65] (OECD 2000, Table 
C1.1).   Regressions predicting these variables are presented in rows 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Appendix 
Table 3.  The statistically significant predictors were per capita GDP, the adult unemployment rate 
and the share of upper-secondary students in pre-vocational and career-technical educational 
programs (Bishop and Mane 2004).  UCBEEES did not reduce school enrollment rates for 15-
19 year olds and had a significant tendency to increase the share of the age cohort 
graduating from upper-secondary school.   This is a remarkable finding.   Some how 
UCBEEES are able to substantially increase academic achievement without decreasing 
school enrollment and graduation rates.  By contrast, minimum competency graduation 
requirements--the student accountability system most popular in the U.S.--appears not to be able 
to simultaneously achieve high achievement and high participation.   
 How do the European UCBEEES accomplish these twin objectives.?   First, UCBEEES 
signal the full range of student achievement to universities and to employers, so all students get 
increased rewards-- better jobs and access to preferred university programs—if they study harder.   
An MCE, by contrast, focuses all of its high stakes incentive effects on a few low achieving 
students who were already at high risk of dropping out.  Most students pass the MCE on the first 
try.  Once they pass, the stimulus to studying and paying attention in class generated by the MCE 
goes away.  Only in the minority of very troubled schools where the majority of students are at risk 
of failing the MCE is student culture likely to be changed by the high stakes test.  Raising the bar is 
politically difficult because many perceive it to be unfair to, in Gary Orfield’s words, “ punish” 
students whose low test scores are the result [at least in part] of attending under funded poorly 
staffed schools.     
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 Second, doing poorly on a European UCBEEE means you graduate with a record of 
modest accomplishment.  It does not prevent you from graduating altogether.  Employers and 
universities take that record into account when they make their decisions.  Students with poor 
exam grades are able to enter less prestigious forms of postsecondary education.   
 Thirdly, UCBEEES pressure individual teachers to improve their teaching.  Their 
colleagues will know how their students do on the exam.  Since the stakes for the students are 
high, parents and school administrators encourage them to set high standards.  They do not 
criticize them for being tough graders as often happens in the U.S (Figlio and Lucas 2001).   
MCEs, by contrast, typically cover material studied in many different courses taught by different 
teachers.  They are often first administered in the fall.  Under these circumstances, individual 
teachers are not considered responsible for how students in their class this term do on the MCE 
test.  When everyone is responsible for student performance, no one is responsible.  The 
formal systems of high school accountability being implemented in many states are much less 
effective than UCBEEES. 
 Fourthly, the end-of-course exams that make up a European UCBEEES are more 
challenging and higher in quality than the MCE and SBE exams that dominate student 
accountability in the U.S.   Taken over a period of two weeks or more, individual exams are 
about three hours long and require students to write long essays, do experiments and show how 
they solved multi-step problems.  This promotes good teaching.  While many MCEs and SBEs 
contain a writing section, the questions on the other exams generally employ a multiple choice 
format and are targeted at a lower level that is typical in Europe.  There is a danger that teaching 
to such a test may ‘dumb down’ the curriculum for the majority of students who are not at risk of 
failing.      
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How to introduce UCBEEES style Accountability to the United States 
3.1. High School Student Accountability should be based on End-of-Course Exams  
 The regression analysis of international data, state NAEP test scores and dropout rates 
summarized above found that end-of-course exams had more positive effects on learning and 
retention than high stakes MCEs and the no/low stakes end-of-grade exams.  Why?  Because: 
a. Responsibility for student performance on a particular exam is focused on just 
one or a small group of teachers. 
b. The classroom culture is improved because everyone is taking the same exam 
and it will be part of the student’s grade in the course.  EOCEs signal the full range of 
achievement in the subject; so everyone has an incentive to study harder in order to do better 
on the test; not just the students at risk of failing the course.  
c. Student attitudes towards that teacher are improved because she becomes a 
coach who helps the class succeed on the state exam.   Her role shifts from being a judge 
towards being a mentor.   New York State has an EOCE system.  Connecticut, 
Massachusetts and New Jersey do not.  Contrasting NY and its neighbors allows us to test 
this assertion.  Surveys of 35,000 students in these states by the Educational Excellence 
alliance found that attitudes toward teachers were more positive in New York. When students 
were asked what motivated them to study hard, New Yorkers were 30 percent more likely to 
respond “to please or impress my teacher,” 17 percent more likely to say ‘my teachers 
encourage me to work hard.’ and 14 percent more likely to say “the teacher demands it.”  
New York students were also significantly more likely to say “my teachers grade me fairly”, 
“my teachers maintain good discipline in the classroom” and that classes are “interesting.” 
d. Student peer support for studying and classroom engagement increases.   Peer 
support of disruptive students decreases.   New York students were 10 percent more 
likely to say, “My friends think it is important for me to do well in [science, math, English] at 
school.” They were nearly 25 percent more likely to be annoyed when “other students talk or 
joke around in class” or “try to get the teacher off track.”   In addition New York students were 
significantly more likely to say they were motivated by a desire to learn the material and more 
likely to report they were interested in what they were studying and more likely to talk with 
their friends outside of class about what they were studying. The better attitudes translated 
into better behavior.  New York students spent significantly more time studying for history 
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exams, more time doing homework and did a larger share of the homework that was 
assigned.  They also paid closer attention in class and contributed to class discussion more 
frequently. 
e. EOCEs assess more difficult material. Since EOCEs are supposed to measure and 
signal the full range of achievement in the subject, they contain more difficult questions and 
problems. This induces teachers to spend more time on cognitively demanding skills and 
topics 
f. Students take the course when they are ready for it.    Alignment between 
instruction and the exam is maximized.  
g. Teachers grade the exam.  Grading exams with essays and other constructed 
response questions is a very effective form of professional development.  In NY, teachers 
participate in the grading of their own student’s exams, so they get good feedback on where 
their teaching failed. 
3.2    Graduated Rewards for Doing Well on State Tests.   The rewards should not be large 
amounts of money for exceeding a cutoff.  They should be graduated and based on absolute 
performance, not performance relative to the other students in the school.   All of these ideas 
have already been implemented by a few states.   
• Scores on state tests should be part of the final grade in the course.   This will 
require that state tests be quickly graded before the end of the school year. 
• Scores on state tests should be on the high school transcript 
• Differentiated diplomas or honors certifications on the existing diploma.  Student 
eligibility for honors diploma certifications should depend on their performance on 
external exams and the rigor of the courses being taken.  They should not depend 
solely on an unweighted GPA.  If a MCE is in place, students who fail the MCE but get 
the requisite number of Carnegie units should get a certificate of completion.    
• Merit Scholarships should be based in part on the state’s curriculum-based 
examinations. Many SREB states have established merit scholarship programs based 
on grade point average and SAT-1/ACT scores.  Students in the states with merit 
scholarships try harder in high school and are more likely to go to and complete college 
(Henry and Rubenstein 2002; Dynarski, 2000; Cromwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2003).  
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States that have EOCs or standards based exams that reliably and validly measure the 
full range of achievement in a subject should consider using scores on these exams as 
one of the criteria together with GPA for awarding the scholarships.  SAT-1 and ACT 
scores would either be dropped or become a supplementary factor.  The standard for 
receiving a scholarship should be such that a third or more of the state’s graduates 
meet it.  As achievement rises the proportion of the graduating class getting the 
scholarship would grow.  The scholarships should be awarded at assemblies attended 
by parents. The size of the award could depend on financial need.  
• Recruit and publicize employers who promise to pay students with the honors 
certifications a higher wage.  Connecticut has done this. 
• Persuade State Colleges and Universities to announce that they use grades on 
state tests in admission and placement decisions for in-state students.     
3.3      Reform the Admissions Policies of State University Systems--   America’s premier 
high stakes tests, the SAT-I and ACT, are not comprehensive measures of learning during high 
school.  The energy that students devote to cracking the SAT-1 would be better spent reading 
widely and learning to write coherently, to think scientifically, to analyze and appreciate great 
literature and to converse in a foreign language.  These are the true objectives of a high school 
education. The high stakes attached to the SAT-1 and the ACT, however, tend to direct student 
energy away from developing these important skills and weakens the ability of teachers to set 
high standards themselves.   
 State university systems should redirect the energy of their state’s high school students 
towards our true educational objectives by using high quality state sponsored curriculum-based 
end-of-course exams—eg. New York State’s Regents exams, North Carolina’s EOCs—or national 
subject specific achievement exams like the SAT-2, Advanced Placement and International 
Baccalaureate exams as important criteria for admission and placement.  Minimum competency 
exams cannot be used for this purpose, so better exams will need to be developed.  State 
departments of education should work with their state university and community college systems 
to develop appropriate exams and methods of using them for admissions and placement 
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purposes. The SAT-1 and ACT would continue to be used for evaluating out-of-state students.  
Changing admissions criteria in this way will help persuade students, parents and school 
administrators that better teaching, more challenging courses and higher achievement will be 
perceived and rewarded by the colleges and universities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enrollment, Attendance and Engagement →  CAHRS WP04-17            
 
Page 32 
Special Study Appendix on: 
Effects of Graduation Requirements and School Size on High School Completion Rates 
by Michael Bishop and John H. Bishop 
 
In this short note we analyze state cross-section data on enrollment rates, public school 
graduation rates and overall high school graduation rates during the 1990s. The dependent 
variables were: 
• the enrollment rate of 17 year olds in April 1990 (source the 1990 Census),  
• Public High School graduation ratio--The ratio of public high school diploma’s awarded in 
1998 to the number of 8th graders in public schools in the Fall of 1993 (adjusted for 
growth of public school enrollment)6 and   
• Overall graduation ratio--The high school graduation ratio in 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1997, 1998 and 1999  (the ratio of the number of regular high school diplomas awarded 
by public and private schools in the state to the number of 17 year olds). 7   
The control variables characterizing the demographic background of the state’s high school age 
youth were as follows:  
• a parents’ education index equal to the average of the percent of parents with a high 
school diploma and the percent of parents with a university degree, 
• incidence of poverty for children under 18. 
• percent population foreign born. 
• percent of public school students African American. 
• percent of public school students Hispanic or Native American8.   
Information on each state’s compulsory school attendance laws and high school 
graduation requirements—minimum competency exams and the number of Carnegie units 
required to graduate both academic and total--were taken from various issues of the Digest of 
Educational Statistics and by contacting accountability staff in states with ambiguous data. The 
policy variables included: 
• The total number of courses (Carnegie units) the state requires for graduation from a 
public high school.  
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• The minimum number of academic courses (Carnegie units) the state requires for 
graduation from a public high school. 
• A dummy variable equal to one if the state has no minimum course graduation 
requirements  
• Compulsory attendance laws--In the models predicting graduation rates, the compulsory 
attendance variable equals one if compulsory attendance lasts through age 17 and 
equals two if it lasts through age 18 (or graduation).  For the model predicting 17 year 
old enrollment rates, the variable is equal to one if the state requires 17 year olds to 
attend school.  
• An index of state rewards or sanctions for schools that depend on test scores of 
students and on dropout rates or graduation rates (available only for the period since 
1995). The index is a sum of four zero-one dummy variables. The first 0-1 variable 
equals one when the state sanctions schools/districts with low scores on state tests that 
fail to improve.  The second 0-1 variable equals one when the state rewards districts that 
significantly improve their scores on state tests.  The third 0-1 variable equals one when 
the state bases ratings of districts in part on drop out or graduation rates.  The fourth 
variable equals one when the state rewards districts in part on the basis of dropout or 
graduation rates. 
• The average size of public high schools in the state. 
 The results of the regression analysis predicting school enrollment rates of 17 year olds 
and public high school graduation rates is presented in Table 1.  The analysis of data on the 
proportion of 17 year olds getting a high school diploma in the state is presented in Table 2. The 
estimated effects of each of the state policies are graphed in Figure 1 and 2.  The statistical 
significance of the coefficients is indicated by the number of asterisks (***s) to the right of the 
coefficient and above or below the bar.  
Carnegie Unit Graduation Requirements: Consistent with previous studies we find 
that increases in total course graduation requirements have a significant tendency to increase 
dropout rates and decrease graduation rates.  Total course graduation requirements had a 
significant negative effect on 1970 enrollment rates and on high school graduation rates in all 
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seven of the years analyzed.  Since academic course graduation requirements were also 
included in the models, the coefficient on the total course graduation requirement variable is an 
estimate of the impact of an increase in non-academic or elective course requirements.  States 
that required two additional elective courses to graduate had enrollment rates that were 0.54 
percentage points lower and high school graduation rates that were 1.36 percentage points 
lower for public schools and 1.16 points lower overall.   
What about the effects of academic course graduation requirements?  Do they, as some 
have hypothesized, have bigger effects on dropout rates than elective course requirements?  
Since total course requirements are included in the model, the coefficient on academic course 
requirements provides a direct test of the hypothesis that the two types of course requirements 
have equal effects.  The bigger effects hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on academic 
requirements will be positive (and significant) in dropout regressions and negative (and 
significant) in graduation rate and enrollment rate regressions.   This hypothesis was decisively 
rejected. In all nine of the regressions, the sign of the estimated effect of academic 
requirements was the opposite of what is predicted by the ‘bigger effects’ hypothesis.  Indeed, 
the opposite hypothesis, that academic requirements have smaller effects than elective 
requirements is accepted in four of the fourteen regressions.   
The sum of the two coefficients is an estimate of the effect of increasing academic 
requirements while holding elective requirements constant.  This sum is never significantly 
different from zero and point estimates of the sum are negative for all six years of event dropout 
rate data and positive for five of six years for which we were able to model overall graduation 
rates.  Our coefficients imply that states requiring two extra academic courses to graduate had 
event dropout rates that were 0.17 percentage points lower on average, public high school 
graduation rates that were .50 percentage points lower and overall graduation rates that were 
.40 percentage points higher on average.  Non-enrollment rates were unaffected by higher 
academic course requirements.  In other word, the regressions are telling us that higher 
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academic course graduation requirements were not associated with higher dropout rates 
and lower graduation rates in the 1990s. Rather it was higher elective and non-academic 
course graduation requirements that appears to have increased drop out rates and 
reduced graduation rates.  
 Minimum Competency Exams: Estimates of the impact of Minimum Competency 
Exams are generally statistically insignificant.  The analysis of enrollment rates and provides no 
support for the conventional wisdom that, enrollment rates are not lower in MCE states.  Point 
estimates are negative as hypothesized in the seven graduation rate models but the coefficient 
is significantly (at the 10 percent level) negative in only one year, 1993.   Effects seem to be 
particularly small (-0.5 percentage points) during the last half of the 1990s.   
 Compulsory school attendance laws: School attendance laws requiring 17 year olds 
to be in school appear to influence enrollment rates in the expected direction.    In 1990 
enrollment rates of 17 year olds were a significant one percentage point higher in states that 
required 17 year olds to be in school.   However, compulsory attendance laws do not appear to 
raise graduation rates.  Three of the seven coefficients on this variable were negative--implying 
that tough laws were associated with lower graduation rates—and none were statistically 
significant.   
 Stakes for Schools Rewards and Sanctions: Our tests of the effect of making dropout 
rates and graduation rates one of the criteria for evaluating school districts for sanctions or 
rewards suggests that the dropout rates reported by schools may be lowered by such a policy.  
States that both rate schools on their ability to retain students and reward them for success in 
lowering dropout rates and increasing test scores had significantly lower event dropout rates at 
the end of the1990s.    
 There is reason, however, to be skeptical because school officials collect the data on 
event dropout rates and report them to the state education departments.   State accountability 
systems that include dropout rates in school ratings generate incentives for school 
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administrators to try extra hard to track down students who have moved and to classify as many 
as possible as having entered some other school (eg. a GED program).   We might be looking 
at a reporting effect, not a real effect.   Graduation rates are therefore a better criterion for 
evaluating the effects of school stakes policies.  Here we get no support for the hypothesis that 
stakes for schools raise graduation rates.   Two of the four coefficients on the school stakes 
variable are negative and none are close to statistical significance. More data and better quality 
data are necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding effects of school 
stakes policies and MCEs on high school graduation rates.  
 Size of High Schools: The school policy with the strongest impact on dropout rates and 
graduation rates was the size of public high schools. States with larger schools had higher 
dropout rates and lower graduation rates.  The mean of the high school size variable was 676 
with a standard deviation of 250.  Our models predict that doubling the mean size from 500 to 
1000 lowers seventeen year old enrollment rates by 2 percentage points, and lowers public high 
school graduation rates by 6.5 percentage points and lowers overall graduation rates by 4.6 
percentage points.   
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Table 1 
 Determinants of Enrollment Rates and Graduation Rates  
 
Percent of 17 
yr olds 
Enrolled in  
School 
Public  H. S 
Graduation 
Rate 
 
 
1990 Census 1998 
Total Courses required to graduate by 
state  
-.26** 
(.10) 
-.68* 
(.38) 
# of  Academic Courses Required to 
Graduate by state 
.23 
(.21) 
.43 
(.78) 
No State Carnegie Unit Grad. 
    Requirement 
-2.21 
(2.80) 
5.92 
(10.56) 
State Minimum Competency Test5 .93 (  .73) 
-.26 
(2.68) 
State School Evaluation 
Sanctions./Rewards Index  
-.23 
(.99) 
Yrs of Attendance Required after age 16 .96* ( .50) 
.27 
(.16) 
Average Size of Secondary Schools -.0039** (.0015) 
-.0130** 
(.0015) 
Parents Education Index1 .24** (.10) 
.133 
(.412) 
% in Poverty - under 19 yrs old 2 -.001 ( .076) 
-.574 
(.447) 
% Foreign Born3 -.054 (.090) 
.705* 
( .377) 
% Public School Students Black4. -.059** (.022) 
-.131 
(.094) 
% Public School Students Hispanic or 
Native  Amer.4 
-.056* 
( .032) 
-.397*** 
(.137) 
Adj R Squared .585 .512 
RMSE 1.55 5.77 
# of Observations 50 49 
Mean: Dep. Variable 88.8 74.1 
+  Statistically significant  at the 10% level one a one tail test   *    Statistically significant at 5% level on 
a one tail test  
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level on a 2 tail test     *** Statistically significant at 1 % level on a 2 
tail test 
1 Average of the percent of parents obtaining a secondary high school diploma and the percent of 
parents obtaining a university degree. Education in States and Nations. National Center for 
Education Statistics. 1991.  Pg. 139.  
2  Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics.  U.S. Department of 
Education.  1991.  Pgs. 49, 129, 119. 
3 1990 Census of Population.  Social and Economic Characteristics U.S.  Pgs. 174-79. No LA. 
4  Digest of Education Statistics. National Center for Education Statistics.1993.  pgs . 61 & 76.  
5 Columns 1 and 2 regressions use a competency exam (MCE) variable for 1991-93 in which VA =0, 
NC = 1 and EOCE = NY.  For columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 the EOCE variable is NY and NC and rhe 
stateMCE variable  adds Ohio and Virginia to the MCE category and subtracts NC. 
Carn27 
Enrollment, Attendance and Engagement →  CAHRS WP04-17            
 
Page 38 
Appendix Table2: 
 Determinants of High School Graduation Rates 
 1992 1993 1994 1997 1998 1999 
99-Incl.  
Other 
Grads 
Total Courses required to 
graduate by state 
-.48+
(.32) 
-.61**
(.29) 
-.55* 
(.31) 
-.65** 
(.31) 
-.69** 
(.32) 
-.53+ 
(.34) 
-.50* 
(.29) 
# of  Academic Courses 
Required to Graduate 
.46 
(.65) 
.67 
(.59) 
.93+ 
(.62) 
1.01+ 
(.65) 
.91 
(.66) 
.67 
(.69) 
.70 
(.58) 
No State Carnegie Unit 
Grad. Requirement 
-3.88
(8.83)
-2.47
(8.02)
1.68 
(8.61)
-1.83 
(8.77) 
-2.07 
(8.93)
-2.50 
(9.38) 
- .80 
(7.94) 
State Minimum Competency 
Test5 
-2.84
(2.28)
-3.23+
(2.07)
-1.31 
(2.08)
-.46 
(2.13) 
-.54 
(2.23)
-.45 
(2.32) 
.69 
(1.97) 
State School Evaluation 
Sanctions./Rewards Index ___ ___ ___ 
.17 
(.81) 
-.13 
(.84) 
.40 
(.88) 
.36 
(.74) 
Yrs of Attendance Required 
after age 16 
-1.50+
(1.03)
-1.43
(.94) 
-.80 
(.96) 
.26 
(.95) 
.10 
(.91) 
.48 
(1.02) 
.67 
(.87) 
Average Size of Secondary 
Schools 
-.0033
(.0050)
-.0042
(.0045)
-.0114**
(.0048)
-.0142***
(.0045)
-.0111**
(.0047)
-.0106** 
(.0049) 
-.0090** 
(.0041) 
Parents Education Index1 1.15***(.33) 
.73**
(.30) 
.81** 
(.32) 
.66** 
(.32) 
.60* 
(.34) 
.69* 
(.35) 
.69* 
(.30) 
% in Poverty - under 19 yrs 
old 2 
.14 
( .30)
-.03 
(.28) 
-.01 
(.29) 
.03 
(.36) 
.03 
(.37) 
.02 
(.39) 
.10 
(.33) 
% Foreign Born3 
 
.03 
(.28) 
-.05 
(.26) 
.29 
(.27) 
.51* 
(.28) 
.23 
(.28) 
.16 
(.30) 
.07 
(.26) 
% Public School Students 
Black4. 
-.04 
(.070)
.03 
(.063)
-.06 
(.069)
-.11+ 
(.076) 
-.14* 
(.079)
-.19** 
(.083) 
-.19*** 
(.070) 
% Public School Students 
Hispanic or Native Amer.4 
-.30***
( .10)
-.24***
(.09) 
-.31***
(.09) 
-.37*** 
(.09) 
-.35***
(.10) 
-.36*** 
(.10) 
-.38*** 
(.09) 
Adj R Squared .596 .612 .598 .616 .607 .595 .638 
RMSE 4.86 4.41 4.64 4.70 4.88 5.12 4.33 
# of Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Mean: Dep. Variable 73.8 72.8 71.0 69.9 71.7 71.4 72.4 
+  Statistically significant  at the 10% level one a one tail test     
*    Statistically significant at 5% level on a one tail test  
 **  Statistically significant at 5% level on a 2 tail test       
*** Statistically significant at 1 % level on a 2 tail test 
1 Average of the percent of parents obtaining a secondary high school diploma and the percent of 
parents obtaining a university degree. Education in States and Nations. National Center for 
Education Statistics. 1991.  Pg. 139.  
2  Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics.  U.S. Department of 
Education.  1991.  Pgs. 49, 129, 119. 
3 1990 Census of Population.  Social and Economic Characteristics U.S.  Pgs. 174-79. No LA. 
4  Digest of Education Statistics. National Center for Education Statistics.1993.  pgs . 61 & 76.  
5 Columns 1 and 2 regressions use a competency exam (MCE) variable for 1991-93 in which VA =0, 
NC = 1 and EOCE = NY.  For columns 3 and 4 the EOCE variable is NY and NC and the state MCE 
variable adds Ohio and Virginia to the MCE category and subtracts NC. 
Carn27 
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Appendix Table 3—Academic Achievement in Nations with and without 
Curriculum-Based External Exit Examination Systems: 
Program for International Student Assessment 2000 Data 
 
 
 
Curriculum-
Based 
External Exit 
Exam 
Log GDP/
Pop 
1995 
East 
Asia 
Adult 
Unemp.  
Rate 
Share Upper 
Secondary 
Students in 
CTE 
Adj R2 
RMSE 
# of 
Obs 
Native Born Students        
Mathematics—15 Yr 
Olds 
39.9*** 
(12.1) 
84.9*** 
(7.9) 
36.6** 
(16.7) 
  .764 
32.7 
41 
   
Science—15 Yr Olds 32.4*** (9.9) 
71.3*** 
(6.5) 
29.7** 
(13.9) 
  .756 
27.1 
41 
Combined Reading 
Literacy —15 Yr Olds 
25.2*** 
(8.8) 
76.6*** 
(5.6) 
15.7 
(11.9) 
  .828 
23.1 
41 
        
School/College Enroll. 
of 15-19 yr olds 
(percent) 
-2.6 
(4.7) 
22.0*** 
(5.0) 
10.4 
(10.6) 
1.27** 
(.57) 
.18* 
(.10) 
.434 
10.1 
28 
        
School/College Enroll. 
of 20-29 yr olds 
(percent) 
2.2 
(3.2) 
10.3*** 
(3.4) 
4.4 
(7.3) 
.62+ 
(.39) 
-.02 
(.07) 
.155 
7.0 
28 
        
Expected FTE Yrs of 
Schooling: 5-65 
-.11 
(.47) 
2.51*** 
(.40) 
.27 
(.73) 
 .020* 
(.010) 
.700 
1.10 
32 
        
Upper-Secondary 
Graduation Rate 
10.4* 
(5.4) 
26.3*** 
(5.9) 
15.3+ 
(8.8) 
1.19+ 
(.70) 
.26* 
(.12) 
.582 
11.0 
23 
Source:   Data on PISA is from OECD,  Literacy Skills for the World of Tomorrow: Further Results From PISA 2000 , 
2003.  Upper-secondary graduation rates, enrollment rates and expected FTE years of schooling are from OECD, 
Education at a Glance 2000 and 2001.  The full-time equivalent number counts part-time enrollment as 0.5 years. Data 
on unemployment rates in OECD countries in the United Nations’ Human Development Report 2001.  The model 
predicting the share of 15-19 and 20-29 year olds in school included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Studies that attempt to measure the effect of CTE by comparing the dropout rates of vocational 
students and other students find it very difficult to control for aspirations and motivation.  One cannot 
evaluate the effect of having an option to take CTE by randomly assigning students to take a CTE course.   
Indeed CTE advocates would predict that forcing a student to take a particular course would increase the 
risk of their dropping out.  Some students do not like academic courses or have been unsuccessful in 
them and are at high risk of dropping out.  This “I dislike academics” (IDA) characteristic cannot be 
controlled for.  When the option of taking CTE courses is presented to all students, the “I dislike 
academics’ (IDA) students will be significantly over represented among CTE course takers.  Let us 
assume that taking a CTE course has no effect on the very high graduation rates of non-IDA students but 
a substantial positive effect on IDA students.  Assume further that the graduation rates of IDA students 
remain low because they are still being required to take some academic courses.  Now let’s hire a 
statistician to compare the subsequent drop out rates of students who do and do not take CTE courses 
controlling for all available background characteristics.  Taking a CTE course is still a marker for being an 
IDA student and regression coefficient on the CTE variable will tend to be biased in the negative direction.  
2 When grading standards vary across high schools, across classrooms within the school and over time, 
employers and universities are not able to place applicants for jobs or admission on a common scale and 
reward them for their accomplishments.  This generates incentives to inflate grades and lower standards.  
Costrell's (1994a) analysis of the optimal setting of educational standards concluded that more centralized 
standard setting (state or national achievement exams) with a local option to set even higher standards 
results in higher standards, higher achievement and higher social welfare than decentralized standard setting 
(ie. teacher grading or schools setting their own graduation requirements).    
3 Costrell’s analysis of optimal standard setting concluded: "The case for perfect information [making scores 
on external examinations available rather than just whether the individual passed or failed] would appear to 
be strong, if not airtight: for most plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under 
decentralization, perfect information not only raises GDP, but also social welfare (1994, p. 970).” 
4 In most studies of the effect of CBEEES, national mean test scores (for an age group or a grade) were 
regressed on per capita gross domestic product deflated by a purchasing power parity price index, a dummy 
for East Asian nation and a dummy for CBEEES.  Analyzing 1994-95 Third International Math and Science 
Study (TIMSS) data, Bishop (1996, 1997) found that 13 year old students from countries with medium and 
high stakes CBEEE systems outperformed students from other countries at a comparable level of economic 
development by 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents (GLE) in science and by 1.0 GLE in mathematics.   Analysis 
of data from the 1990-01 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement’s study of 
the reading literacy study of 14 year olds in 24 countries found that students in countries with CBEEES were 
about 1.0 GLE ahead of students in nations that lacked a CBEEES (Bishop 1999).  Analysis of data from 
both waves of TIMSS data collection also implies that CBEEES have highly significant effects (of about 1.5 
GLEs) on the math and science achievement in 8th grade (Bishop 2003).    
5 This is one of the reasons why Amerein and Berliner’s (2002) interrupted time series approach to 
measuring the effects of high stakes tests is flawed.  The other weaknesses of the study are errors in 
dating the introduction of high stakes tests in many states, the use of national average scores as a 
comparison rather than states that did not implement high stakes testing and the arbitrary way of handling 
changing rates of exclusion.   
6 Source of data on the adjusted ratio of diplomas awarded in 1998 to 8th grade public school enrollment 
in Fall 1993 was Jay Greene, High School Graduation Rates in the United States, November 2001, 
Manhattan Institute, 1-22.   Between 8th and 12th grade some students move across state lines or transfer 
into or out of the private school sector.   Consequently, simply dividing diplomas awarded in year t by 8th 
graders in t-4 produces inaccurate measures of public high school completion rates.   Without 
adjustments, rapidly growing population will inflate the state’s graduation rate indicator; falling population 
will depress the indicator.  Jay Greene used public school enrollment growth from 1993 to 1998 to correct 
for differential population growth rates.  
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7   Data on diplomas awarded by public high schools and private high schools are from various issues of 
the Digest of Education Statistics and Public School Student, Staff and Graduate Counts by State, School 
Year 1999-2000., NCES 2001-326r, May 2001.  Students who received certificates of completion from 
their high school or passed the Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) test were not counted as a regular 
graduate.  The population of 17 year olds is the base rather than 18 year olds because the number of 18 
year olds may be effected by out-migration and in-migration of college students and military personnel.  
The Census Bureau’s estimates of state populations for years 1991 through 1999 become increasingly 
inaccurate as one moves away from 1990.   To test the accuracy of Census Bureau estimates for inter-
censal years, I added one additional year of population growth to their published estimate for 1999 and 
then compared it to actual counts from the April 2000 Census.  For 17 year olds, Census extrapolations 
were 5.5 percent below the actual for Connecticut, 4.0 percent below for Florida, 4.4 percent below for 
New Jersey and 4.6 percent below for New York.  Some of the over predictions were even larger: 7.2 
percent for Kansas, 8.2 percent for Alaska and Wyoming, 4.5 percent for Kentucky and Washington.  
Following the advice of Census personnel, I assumed that the year 2000 error had grown in equal 
increments over the decade.  The resulting estimate of the error for each year was then added to the 
original Census estimate of 17 year olds in the state to create the ‘corrected’ estimates of 17 year old 
population that were used in the analysis.    
8   The sample included 49 states plus the District of Columbia.  Hawaii was not included because we 
could not control for the effects of Pacific Islander ethnicity. The majority of Hawaiian students report 
Pacific Islander ethnicity and these students are significantly more likely to drop out than local Whites and 
Asians.   
 
